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ESTATE OF UARClA
r34 C.2d flD: 210 P.2d 841)

[8. F. No. 17770. In Bank.

Nov. 1, 1949.J

Estate of THERESA UARCIA,· Deceased. HENRY MAR·
SHAlL. Appellant. v. M.ARY ROGERS, 88 ·AdminIstra·
trix, etc., Respondent.
[1) Decedents' Estates - Appeal- Orders Appealab!e.- An order
denying petitioner's motion to amend his petition after a Judg·
ment on the pleadings precluding hlm from participating as
an heir in the distribution of an estate is not appealable under
Prob. Code, § 1240, and an appeal from such order must be
dismissed.
[2] Adoption-By LegitimatioD-Eifect-lUght .to lDherit.-Civ.
Code, § 230, relating to the adoption of an illegitimate ehild
by the father's public acknowledgment and reception of the
child into his family, is not qualified by Prob. Code, § 255, per·
mitting an illegitimate child to inherit from the estate of the
mother without exception, but from the kindred of the father
only where its parents have intermarried and the tather has
thereafter acknowledged or adopted it as legitimate; the two
sections provide alternate methods by which a person may
become the heir of his father.
[S] Id.-By Legitimation-Effect-Right to lDherit.-With Tl'gard
to inheritance from or through the fatheT, the words "illegiti.
mate child" in Prob. Code, § 255, are applicable, not to every
child who is born illegitimate, but only to children, born illegitimate, who have not been legitimated under either section
215 or section 230 of the Civil Code; hence the statutes are
not in conflict. (Disapproving dictum of Supremt' Court to
the contrary in its opinion on denial of hearing in Wolf v. Gall,
32 Cal.App. 286, 163 P. 346, 350.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco precluding petitioner from
participating as an heir in distribution of an estate, and from
an order denying motion to amend petition after judgment.
Thomas M. Foley and George W. Schonfeld, JUdges. Judgment reversed; appeal from order dismissed.
[2J See 1 Cal.Jur.452.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estate:!, § 1129; [2, 3]
Adoption, § 55.
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Benjamin C. Mickle and A. B. Bianchi for Appellant.
J. J. Henderson and Donald E. Wachhorst as Amici Curiae,
on behalf of Appellant.
Donahue, Richards, Rowell & Gallagher and A. R. Rowell
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner has appealed from a judgment
entered on the pleadings precluding him from participating
as an heir in the distribution of his paternal aunt's estate, as
well as from an order denying his motion to amend his petition after judgment. [1] The order is not appealable under
the provisions of section 1240 of the Probate Code, and the
appeal therefrom must be dismissed. The petition on which
judgment was entered again!>t petitioner on the pleadings
alleged that although born the illegitimate son of decedent's
brother, he had been legitimated by his father under the provisions of section 230 of the Civil Code. Respondent, administratrix of the estate of petitioner's aunt, conlends that under
section 255 of the Probate Code petitioner cannot inherit
any part of the aunt's estate because his parents never intermarried.
Section 230 of the Civil Code provides: "The father of an
illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were
a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child
is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time
of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption. " Section 255 of the Probate Code
provides: "Every illegitimate child is an heir of his mother,
and also of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence
of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father,
and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case
may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful
wedlock; but he does not represent his father by inheriting
any part of the estate of the father's kindred, either lineal or
collateral, unless, before his death, his parents shall have intermarried, and his father, after such marriage, acknowledges
him as his child, or adopts him into his family; in which case
such child is deemed legitimate for all purposes of succession.
An illegitimate child may represent his mother and may inIwrit any part of the estate of the mother's kindred either
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lineal or collateral." The issue, therefore, is whether section
255 of the Probate Code qualifies section 230 of the Civil Code
and governs the inheritance of all persons born illegitimate
,,'hether or not they are subsequently legitimated.
[2] The cases involving the right of a person born illegitimate to inherit directly from his father have uniformly
held that section 230 is not qualified by section 255; that the
two sections provide alternate methods by which a person
may become the ht'ir of his father. (Estate of Pico, 52 Cal.
84. 87; In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 421-422 [21 P. 976, 22 P.
742. 1028. 6 L.R.A. 594] ; Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763. 767
[21 P.2d 579] ; Estate of Lund, 26 Cal.2d 472. 482 [159 P.2d
643. 162 A.L.R. 606].) [3] It is clear. therefore. that with
regard to direct inheritance from the father, the words "illegitimate child" in section 255 are applicable. not to every
child who is born illegitimate, but only to children, born illegitimate, who have not been legitimated under either section
215 or section 230 of the Civil Code. These words must have
the same meaning with regard to inheritance through the
father if their meaning has any consistency. Otherwise the
restrictive language of section 255- would conflict with the
provision of section 230 of the Civil Code that a child legitimated by adoption is thereafter "deemed for all purposes
legitimate," and the provision of section 215 of the Civil Code
that "A ehild born before wedlock becomes legitimate by the
subsequent marriage of its parents." A child who is "deemed
for all purposes legitimate" cannot be regarded as still illegitimate for some purposes, and a child who has become legimate can no longer be regarded as an "illegitimate child."
The statutes are not in conflict when the words "illegitimate child" are interpreted as referring only to children
born illegitimate who have not been legitimated under the
provisions of the Civil Code. Although this interpretation
renders some of the restrictive language of section 255 superfluous, it is supported by the legislative history of the statutes regarding legitimation and inheritance by illegitimates
as well as the eases involving the rights of direct inheritance
of those born illegitimate. (See 29 Cal.L.Rev. 185, 187-191.)
The forerunner of section 255 of the Probate Code was enacted
." [B]ut he does not represent his father by inheriting any part of
the estate of the father's kindrt'd, either Iinenl or collateral, unlet!8, before
his death, hill parents shall have interrnnrried, and his father, after
such marriage, aclmowledies him &8 his child, or adopts him into hia

fa.milJr. • • ."
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in 1850 (Cal. Stats. 1850, pp. 219-220) to provide a
by which a person born illegitimate could inherit from
"mother, and if his father forma.1ly acknowledged him,
inherit from his father, and if his natural parents later
ried could inherit as a legitimate child. It was not until
that the forerunners of sections 215 and 230 of the Civil
were enacted to provide for the legitimation for all nnl<nnll_lI
of persons born illegitimate. (Cal. Stats.1870, §§ 8-9,
531.) While thus mitigating further the burdens of lllelnu.·\11
macy, however, the Legislature repealed the statute of
(Cal. Stats. 1870, p. 531), the only law by which those
legitimated under the new statutes could inherit at' all.
Legislature corrected this error by ineptly including the wh(ilila
of section 1387 (now Prob. Code, § 255) in the Civil Code
1872. We do not believe that in reenacting the older n1'llVl.,-S
sion to restore the rights of those who remained illElgitmuate,;l
the Legislature intended to limit the effectiveness of the
sections of the Civil Code derived from the act of 187() under
whieb a person born illegitimate could attain the status of
legitimacy for all purposes. The trend of legislation governing the rights of persons bOrn illegitimate is to give them the·
same status as those born legitimate. (See BWieccio v. BotMfl,
27 Cal.2d 621, 626 [165 P.2d 677].) It would be unreasonable,
to conclude that because the Legislatu1''! readopted an old
provision made partially obsolete by later legislation to flU
the gap created by the statutory changes of 1870, it intended'
to limit the effect of the general legitimation statutes. It'
would be even more unreasonable to hold that the words
legitimate child" appearing in section 255 have one meaning
when read with the part of the statute providing for direct
inheritance and another when read with the provision governing collateral inheritance. Accordingly, those words refer, not to every child who is born illegitimate, but only to such
children who have not been legitimated under the provisions
of sections 215 or 230 of the Civil Code. The dictum of this
court to the contrary in its opinion on denial of hearing in
WoZfv. GalZ,32 Cal.App. 286 [163 P. 346, 350], is disapproved.
The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order denying petitioner's motion to amend his petition is dismissed.

un_ .

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, .J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

